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ON THE CANONICAL FORMULA OF C. LE´VI-STRAUSS
JACK MORAVA
‘No’, was the answer. ‘We have come to give you metaphors for
poetry’. W.B. Yeats, A Vision
This note sketches a formal mathematical interpretation for the anthropologist
Claude Le´vi-Strauss’s ‘canonical formula’
Fx(a) : Fy(b) ∼ Fx(b) : Fa−1(y)
which he has found useful in analysing the structure of myths. Maranda’s volume
[10] is a useful introduction to this subject, which has a somewhat controversial
history [5] among mathematicians. In view of the perspective proposed here (in
terms of finite non-commutative groups), I believe that skepticism is quite under-
standable. Nevertheless, I believe that Le´vi-Strauss knows what he means to say,
and that difficulties in interpreting his formula are essentially those of translation
between the languages of disciplines (anthropology and mathematics) that normally
don’t engage in much conversation.
I am posting this in the hope of encouraging such dialog. This document is ad-
dressed principally to mathematicians, and does not attempt to summarize any
anthropological background; but in hopes of making it a little more accessible to
people in that field, I have spelled out a few technical terms in more detail that
mathematicians might think necessary.
I believe that Le´vi-Strauss perceives the existence of a nontrivial anti-automorphism
of the quaternion group of order eight; the latter is a mathematical object similar
to, but more complicated than, the Klein group of order four which has appeared
elsewhere in his work, cf. eg. [7 §6.2 p. 403], [14 p. 135]. In the next few paragraphs
I will define some of these terms, and try to explain why I believe the formulation
above captures what LS means to say. I want to thank the anthropologist Fred
Damon for many discussions about this topic, and in particular for drawing my
attention to Maranda’s volume, which has been extemely helpful.
1 I was especially happy to find, in at least three separate places in that book,
anthropologists raising the question of whether the two sides of the canonical for-
mula are intended to be understood on a symmetrical footing [see [12 p. 35], [13
p. 83], and, most clearly, [3 p. 202]]; in other words, whether the symbol ∼ in
Le´vi-Strauss’s formula is meant to be an equivalence relation in the mathematical
sense.
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If formal terms, an equivalence relation is a relation between two objects (to be
concrete: triangles in the plane), with the properties that
i) if object A is related to object B (in symbols: A ∼ B), and object B is related
to object C (ie B ∼ C) then necessarily A ∼ C, ie object A is related to object C;
ii) if A is related to B, then B is similarly related to A (this is the axiom of
symmetry, which can be stated symbolically: if A ∼ B then B ∼ A), and finally
iii) the axiom of reflexivity: any object is related to itself, ie A ∼ A.
This notion permits us to disguish equivalence from identity; thus in plane geometry
the symbol ∼ is traditionally used for the relation of similarity, which means that
two triangles have the same angles, but are not necessarily of the same size. The
point is that things can resemble each other in various ways [size, color,. . . ], and that
there may be good reason to compare differing sorts of equivalences (in the way
that CLS says that his formula is about ‘analogies between analogies’). What Coˆte´,
Racine, and Schwimmer all suggest is an interpretation of the canonical formula
in which the right-hand side is a transformation of the left; in more standard
mathematical notation, this might be written
Fx(a) : Fy(b)→ Fx(b) : Fa−1(y)
The existence of such a transformation turning the left side into the right does not
preclude that transformation from being an equivalence; all it does is allow us to
regard axiom ii) above as optional. This fits quite naturally with current thinking
about category theory.
2 To explain why this is relevant involves a short digression about the roles of the
two characters a, b and the two functions x, y in the formula, cf. [13 p. 73-76].
This is in turn related to the role of symbolic notation in the first place.
Mathematicians use what they call variables, ie symbols such as a, b, x, y, to ex-
press relations which hold for a large class of objects, cf. [1 Ch. A §7]; but to
interpret these relations, it is necessary to understand where the assertion is in-
tended to hold. Thus, for example, a relation which makes sense for triangles
might not make sense for real numbers. Another important background issue in
the interpretation of mathematical formulas is the role of what are called quanti-
fiers, which tell us whether (for example) the formula is intended to hold for every
object in an appropriate class, or perhaps only that some object exists, for which
the relation holds.
In the case of the canonical formula, this is particularly important, because such
background information about quantifiers and domain of validity has been left
unspecified. The formula requires one of its characters (a) to have an associated
function (a−1), cf. [12 p. 83], and it also requires one of the functions (y) to play
the role of a character, on the right side of the formula: this is a key part of the
formula’s assertion, in some ways its central essential double twist. The formula
is thus intrinsically unsymmetric: it is not required that the character b have an
associated function b−1, nor that the function x have a sensible interpretation as
a character. This suggests that the canonical formula can be paraphrased as the
assertion:
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• In a sufficiently large and coherent body of myths we can identify characters a, b
and functions x, y, such that the mythical system defines a transformation which
sends a to b, y to a−1, and b to y, while leaving x invariant.
This transformation will therefore send the ratio, or formal analogy, Fx(a) : Fy(b)
into the ratio Fx(b) : Fa−1(y): this is the usual statement of the formula.
3 I don’t think this is very controversial; several of the contributors to [10] have
suggested similar interpretations. I have gone into the question in some detail,
however, to make the point that if we can treat the right-hand side of the canonical
formula on an equal footing with the left-hand side, we should then be able to apply
the canonical formula again; but with b now as the new a, y as the new b, and a−1
as the new y, defining a chain
Fx(a) : Fy(b)→ Fx(b) : Fa−1(y)→ Fx(y) : Fb−1(a
−1) .
which is consistent with the interpretation of Fx(a) as kind of ratio x/a of x to a:
the left and right-hand sides of the chain above then become the valid rule
x/a
y/b
=
x/y
b−1/a−1
for the manipulation of grammar-school fractions. Mosko’s [11] variant
Fx(a) : Fy(b) ∼ Fx(b) : Fy(a) ,
of Le´vi-Strauss’s formula also has such an interpretation, when the algebraic values
assigned to the variables lie in a commutative group in which every element has
order two, neutralizing the opposition between a and a−1. This presents Mosko’s
equation as a version of the CF valid in particularly symmetrical situations.
4 I’ve spelled this argument out because it suggests that interpreting the canonical
formula as expressing the existence of a transformation relating its two sides is
a useful idea. The remainder of this note will be concerned with the quaternion
group mentioned in the first paragraph, as an example of a consistent classical
mathematical system exemplifying Le´vi-Strauss’s formula.
It may be useful to say here that a group, in mathematical terminology, is a system
of ‘elements’ (real numbers, for example), together with a system of rules for their
combination (eg addition). There are lots of such critters, and some of them are
not commutative, in the sense that the order in which we combine the elements
may be significant. In the case of real numbers, order is not important (and hence
it’s conceivable one’s checkbook might balance); but rotations in three-dimensional
space (cf. Rubik’s cube) form another example of a group, in which the order of
operations is important.
The quaternion group of order eight (there are other quaternion groups, cf. [2 §5.2])
is the set
Q = {±1, ±i, ±j, ±k} ,
with a noncommutative law of multiplication, in which the product of the elements
i and j (in that order) is k, but the product in the opposite order is −k; in other
words,
i · j = k = −j · i, j · k = i = −k · j, k · i = j = −i · k .
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To complete the ‘multiplication table’ for this group, we have to add the relations
i · i = j · j = k · k = −1 ,
as well (last but not least) as the relation (−1)2 = +1. The Klein group K , which
has appeared previously in Le´vi-Strauss’s work, can be similarly described, as a
commutative version of the group Q; in other words, the multiplication table is
as before, except that we don’t bother with the plus and minus signs:
K = {1, i, j, k} ,
given the simpler multiplication table
i · j = k = j · i, j · k = i = k · j, k · i = j = i · k ,
together with the relations
i · i = j · j = k · k = 1
(and of course relations like 1 · i = i = i · 1, etc.).
Two groups are isomorphic if their elements correspond in a way which pre-
serves the multiplication laws: thus in Le´vi-Strauss’s writings the Klein group is
described as the set of transformations which send a symbol x to the possible val-
ues x, −x, 1/x, −1/x; the first such transformation [x → x] corresponds to the
‘identity’ element 1 in the presentation of K given above, while the second, ie
x → −x, corresponds to the element i; similarly x → 1/x corresponds to j, etc.
It is straightforward to check that the multiplication tables of these two structures
correspond, eg the composition of the transformations x → −x (corresponding
to i) with the composition x → 1/x (corresponding to j) is the transformation
x→ 1/(−x) = −1/x corresponding to k, and so forth.
Similarly, an anti-isomorphism of groups is an invertible transformation which
reverses multiplication: it is a map which sends the product of any two elements
g, h (in that order) to the product of the image elements, in the reverse order. In
the case of commutative groups, this is a distinction without a difference, but in
the case of a noncommutative group such as Q, it can be significant.
5 For example: the transformation λ : Q → Q which sends i to k, j to i−1 = −i,
and k to j is a nontrivial example of an antiautomorphism: for example,
λ(i · j) = λ(k) = j = (−i) · k = λ(j) · λ(i) ,
while
λ(j · k) = λ(i) = k = j · (−i) = λ(k) · λ(j) ,
etcetera. Once this is established, it is easy to check that the assignment
x 7→ 1, a 7→ i, y 7→ j, b 7→ k
sends the antiautomorphism λ to the transformation
x→ x, a→ b, y → a−1, b→ y
defining the canonical formula.
6 Quod, as we say in the trade, erat demonstrandum: this presents an example of
a consistent mathematical system, satisfying a version of Le´vi-Strauss’s formula.
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It is a standard principle of mathematical logic, that the consistency of a system
of axioms can be verified by giving just one example of an interpretation in which
those axioms hold true; but I believe that in this case, there may be more to
the story. Logicians are concerned with questions of logical truth, which can be
formulated in terms of the commutative group {±1} [which can alternately be
described in terms of two-valued ‘yes-no’ judgements, or in terms of the even-odd
distinction among integers]. The Klein group is an interesting kind of ‘double’ of
this group, with four elements rather than two, and the quaternion group takes
this doubling process yet one step further. Something similar seems to occur in the
study of kinship structures [15], but the groups encountered in that field remain
necessarily commutative.
7 I believe the interpretation proposed here is also helpful in understanding another
aspect of the canonical-formula problem, which other commentators have also found
confusing: in [8 Ch. 6 p. 156], Le´vi-Strauss invokes the formula
Fx(a) : Fy(b) ∼ Fy(x) : Fa−1(b) .
This differs from the previous version: now x on the left of the equation becomes
y on the right, while a on the left becomes x on the right, y is transformed into
a−1, and finally b remains invariant. In the framework of paragraph six above, the
assignment
x 7→ i, y 7→ j, a 7→ k, b 7→ 1
expresses this transformation as another anti-automorphism of Q, defined now by
σ(i) = j, σ(j) = k−1 = −k, σ(k) = i .
The two transformations differ by the cyclic transformation
τ : i 7→ j 7→ k 7→ i
which group-theorists call an outer automorphism, of order three, of the quaternion
group Q: in these terms, λ = τ ◦ σ. The point is that the symmetries [17] of Q
form a larger group; if we include anti-automorphisms among them, we get a very
interesting group of order twenty-four, in which both transformations λ and σ might
be understood as playing a distinguished role.
8 Perhaps it will be useful to mention that modern mathematical logic (cf. eg
[6]) is very sophisticated, and is willing to study systems with ‘truth-values’ in
quite general commutative groups, in a way entirely consistent with Chris Gregory’s
Ramusian [4] precepts; but to my knowledge, logic with values in non-commutative
groups has been studied only in contexts motivated by higher mathematics (see eg
[9]). This may explain, to some extent, the difficulty people have had, in finding a
mathematical interpretation of Le´vi-Strauss’s ideas; but it seems clear to me that
such an interpretation does exist, and that as far as I can see, it fits integrally with
Le`vi-Strauss’s earlier work on the subject.
I hope those who read this will not be offended if I close with a personal remark.
When I first encountered Le´vi-Strauss’s formula, my reaction was bemusement and
skepticism; I took the question seriously, in large part because I was concerned that
it might represent an aspect of some kind of anthropological cargo-cult, based on a
fetishization of mathematical formalism. I am an outsider to the field, and can make
judgements of Le´vi-Strauss’s arguments only on the basis of internal consistency
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(in so far as I am competent to understand them); but I have to say that I am now
convinced that the man knows his business.
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